

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

54

ORIGIN PRS-01

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CCO-00

( ISO ) R

DRAFTED BY S/PRS:JJFEENEY:HHB

APPROVED BY S/PRS - JOHN H. TRATTNER

S/S - MR. ORTIZ

----- 063656

P 202111Z JAN 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

INFO CINCPAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS:SOPN (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: TRAVELING PRESS REPORTAGE, TUESDAY, JAN. 20, 1976

FOR FUNSETH FROM TRATTNER

FOR CINCPAC: PASS DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL

NO. 2

TV/RADIO

BERNARD KALB, CBS RADIO, FIRST LINE REPORT, WASHINGTON --

"..THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION,  
WITH KISSINGER AS THE IMPRESSARIO OF DETENTE, OVERSOLD  
DETENTE TO AN EAGER AMERICAN PUBLIC. KISSINGER KNEW  
BETTER, BUT PRESIDENT NIXON SAW VOTES IN THAT MAKE-  
BELIEVE VIEW OF DETENTE, AND SO, DETENTE WAS MERCHANDISED  
AS SOMETHING THAT ONLY RICHARD NIXON HAD THE GENIUS TO  
ACHIEVE.

"..BUT DETENTE REALLY SHOULD NEED NO SALESMAN.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

"TRUE DETENTE, A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS, IS AN IMPERATIVE

IN A WORLD STOCKPILED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AN OVER-WHELMING EFFORT TO MAKE IT WORK SHOULD BE AT THE TOP OF ANY STATEMEN'S AGENDA. IT IS IN THAT SENSE THAT THIS LATEST KISSINGER MISSION TO MOSCOW SHOULD BE VIEWED, -- AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO SEE WHETHER WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW CAN STRIKE A COMPROMISE THAT WOULD PRODUCE A NEW AGREEMENT ON LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ALTERNATIVE, OBVIOUSLY, IS A SIDDEN SPURT IN TENSIONS, WITH A CERTAINTY OF STILL ANOTHER ARMS RACE. IT IS NOT AN EASY ASSIGNMENT. IT IS FILLED WITH COMPLEXITIES AND TECHNICALITIES. EACH SIDE FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO GIVE UP THAT LAST EXTRA INCH TO REACH A COMPROMISE. AND A COMPROMISE WILL REQUIRE THAT. OTHERWISE, THERE WILL BE A DEADLOCK.

"THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DEADLOCKED FOR MORE THAN A YEAR NOW...ARE TRYING TO REACH A NEW SALT AGREEMENT, AS IT'S CALLED. THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE AGREEMENT WERE REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK IN LATE 1974 WHEN PRESIDENT FORD AND SOVIET LEADER BREZHNEV PUT A CEILING OF 2,400 STRATEGIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS FOR EACH SIDE. THAT, COMPARATIVELY, WAS EASY. THE TRICKY PART CAME IN DEFINING THE 2,400. THE TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS STILL REMAINING ARE HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SOVIET BACKFIRE BOMBER, AND THE AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILE, A KIND OF FLYING BOMB. SHOULD THESE BE INCLUDED IN THE 2,400 OR NOT? WHAT ABOUT FLYING RANGE. DOES THE RANGE DICTATE THAT THEY BE INCLUDED IN THE 2,400? THE LIST OF QUESTIONS IS NOT SHORT.

"KISSINGER AND THE RUSSIANS WILL BE SPENDING SEVERAL DAYS THIS WEEK TRYING TO REACH A BREAKTHROUGH. THEY HAVE FAILED BEFORE. WILL THEY SUCCEED THIS TIME?

"IT'S DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE KISSINGER FLYING OFF TO FAILURE. DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE RUSSIANS INVITING KISSINGER TO MOSCOW UNLESS THERE ARE SOME COMPROMISES TO TALK ABOUT. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT A FAILURE THIS TIME AROUND COULD PRODUCE A SEVERE BODY-BLOW TO DETENTE. THE RESULTS COULD BE KNOWN BEFORE THE WEEK IS OUT."

RICHARD VALERIANI, NBC-TV "TODAY SHOW", ANDREWS AFB --  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

"...THE PRINCIPLE PURPOSE OF KISSINGER'S THREE DAY MISSION TO MOSCOW IS TO WORK OUT ANOTHER AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON LIMITING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE COMPLICATED BY THE HEAVY RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, AND THAT SUBJECT IS EXPECTED TO BE A MAJOR PART OF HIS TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS. BEFORE LEAVING, KISSINGER HAD THIS TO SAY.

"KISSINGER: THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO GO TO MOSCOW TO SEE WHETHER ANY PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN LIMITING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. LIMITING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND ENDING IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL AMERICANS, AND IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THE WORLD. I'M ALSO GOING TO MOSCOW

TO MAKE CLEAR TO MY HOSTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ACCEPT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND THAT THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH MEASURES MUST LEAD TO A DETERIORATION IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

"THE VERY FACT THAT KISSINGER IS GOING TO MOSCOW IS A GOOD INDICATION THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE MODIFIED THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS TO THE POINT WHERE A BREAKTHROUGH IS LIKELY IN THE ARMS CONTROL TALKS. IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT, THE WHOLE POLICY OF DETENTE, RELAXING EAST-WEST TENSIONS, WILL BE IN DANGER. BUT EVEN IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT, KISSINGER EXPECTS A REAL BATTLE ON CAPITOL HILL BEFORE IT'S APPROVED. "

BARRIE DUNSMORE, ABC-TV "GOOD MORNING AMERICA," ANDREWS AFB --

"THIS IS ONE OF HENRY KISSINGER'S MORE IMPORTANT TRIPS. ITS PURPOSE IS TO WORK OUT A COMPROMISE ON THE SECOND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY, BUT IT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL DEAL WITH THE STRAINED U.S. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES OVER THE WAR IN ANGOLA, AND SOME MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY MAY VERY WELL BE DISCUSSED.

"SALT II IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT'S THE VERY BASIS FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE BROAD

FRAMEWORK OF THE SECOND SALT AGREEMENT WAS SET IN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

VLADIVOSTOK IN LATE 1974. BUT SINCE THEN THERE'S BEEN DISAGREEMENT ON COUNTING, TESTING AND DEPLOYING THE RUSSIAN MEDIUM RANGE BOMBER KNOWN AS THE BACKFIRE, AND THE AMERICAN LOW-FLYING MISSILE CALLED CRUISE.

"THE FACT IS ACTUALLY MAKING THE TRIP SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE A COMPROMISE WORKED OUT, AND THAT A FULL SALT II AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. THERE IS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, CONSIDERABLE DEBATE IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT THE MERITS OF SALT II. BUT MESSRS. FORD AND KISSINGER ARE GOING AHEAD ANYWAY. AND, BASED ON RECENT STATEMENTS IN MOSCOW, THERE SEEMS TO BE COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON BOTH SIDES THAT FURTHER LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS IS AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT FOR CONTINUED PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. "

WIRES

REUTERS (NELSON) FROM COPENHAGEN -- NELSON LEADS WITH STATE-MENT FROM U.S. OFFICIALS THAT "AMERICAN-BACKED FORCES IN ANGOLA ARE HEADING FOR ALMOST CERTAIN DEFEAT." DESPITE KISSINGER DEPARTURE REMARK THAT U.S. CANNOT ACCEPT SOVIET INTERVENTION, OFFICIAL ON PLANE HAD "LITTLE REAL HOPE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ABANDON" MPLA IN VIEW OF U.S. INABILITY TO ASSIST MPLA OPPONENTS. ON PLANE "KISSINGER...MADE IT CLEAR HE WOULD NOT PENALIZE THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS ANGOLA ACTIONS BY DELAYING THE ARMS TALKS." AFTER ARRIVING IN DENMARK HE SAID ANGOLA MADE COLLABROATION WITH SOVIETS ON ME MORE DIFFICULT AND REPEATED WARNING TO ALL ON UNILATERAL ACTS AGAINST LEBANON.

KISSINGER WILL TRY TO TRADE OFF CRUISE MISSILE AGAINST BACKFIRE.

DOD EXPERT WADE IS ALONG "TO KEEP US HONEST", OFFICIAL JOKED.

U.S. OFFICIALS APPEARED SOMEWHAT BITTER OVER CUBAN VICTORIES IN ANGOLA. WITH ONLY 30 MILLION DOLLARS UNITA AND FNLA COULD HAVE FORCED NEGOTIATIONS. WITH \$50 MILLION THEY WOULD HAVE SWEEPED CUBANS OUT.  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 014068 TOSEC 010019

UPI (DANILOFF) -- KISSINGER SAYS U.S. WOULD OPPOSE ALL OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN LEBANON. STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDED ISRAEL IN STRONGEST STATEMENT TO DATE ON CURRENT CRISIS. KISSINGER ALSO WARNED KREMLIN THAT ANGOLA COULD DAMAGE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

AP (SCHWEID) -- KISSINGER WARNS SOVIETS THAT ANGOLA-TYPE INTERVENTION COULD IMPERIL RELATIONS WITH U.S. AT THE SAME TIME HE IS DETERMINED TO BREAK SALT DEADLOCK AND WILL NOT "BE DETERRED BY POLITICAL CONCERNS" OF ELECTION YEAR. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE TOP U.S. NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR JAMES WADE IS ACCOMPANYING KISSINGER WHO DECLEARED THE U.S. "WILL NEVER CONCEDE STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY" TO SOVIETS.

NY TIMES (GWERTZMAN) -- BRIEF RUNDOWN ON KISSINGER TRIP IS FOLDED INTO PIECE ON FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF THE STATE OF THE UNION. MONDAY MORNING NSC MEETING WENT OVER INSTRUCTIONS TO KISSINGER FOR TWO WORKING DAY MOSCOW STOP. THREE GOALS: UNBLOCK SALT, REDUCE BIG POWER INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA, ARRANGE RECONVENING OF ME TALKS IN GENEVA.

DAILY NEWS (CARTER) -- "THE PRIMARY ANNOUNCED TASK OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S FOUR DAY VISIT IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL" WILL BE TO BREAK THE SALT DEADLOCK. "IN ADDITION TO THIS, RELIABLE INFORMANTS SAID, KISSINGER WILL TRY TO WORK OUT A DEAL FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO ANGOLA PROBLEM." HE TOLD AFRICAN DIPLOMATS LAST WEEK HE EXPECTED STRIFE TO END WITHIN A MONTH. IF THIS IS NOT WISHFUL THINKING, KISSINGER MAY ALREADY HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS IN KEEPING WITH HIS "CLOSE TO THE VEST NEGOTIATING STYLE."

NOTHING TODAY FROM MARDER AND KEATLEY.

SISCO

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TOSEC, PRESS COMMENTS, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, DETENTE, INTERVENTION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SALT (ARMS CONTROL)  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 20 JAN 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976STATE014068  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** JJFEENEY:HHB  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760021-0772  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760140/aaaabjhz.tel  
**Line Count:** 237  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN PRS  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** greeneet  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 29 JUL 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <29 JUL 2004 by castelsl>; APPROVED <08 NOV 2004 by greeneet>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** TRAVELING PRESS REPORTAGE, TUESDAY, JAN. 20, 1976 FOR FUNSETH FROM TRATTNER  
**TAGS:** SOPN, PFOR, PARM, PGOV, OVIP, US, UR, CU, AO, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** SECRETARY  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006